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ABSTRACT
In the US, where registration of lobbyists is mandatory, the pharmaceutical industry and private 
health-care providers spend huge amounts of money seeking to influence health policies 
and government decisions. In Brazil, where lobbying lacks transparency, there is virtually no 
data on drug industry expenditure to persuade legislators and government officials of their 
viewpoints and to influence decision-making according to commercial interests. Since 1990, 
however, the Associação da Indústria Farmacêutica de Pesquisa (Interfarma – Pharmaceutical 
Research Industry Association), Brazilian counterpart of the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), main lobbying organization of the US pharmaceutical 
industry, has played a major role in the advocacy of interests of major drug companies. The main 
goals of Interfarma lobbying activities are: shortening the average time taken by the Brazilian 
regulatory agency (ANVISA) to approve marketing authorization for a new drug; making the 
criteria for incorporation of new drugs into SUS (Brazilian Unified Health System) more flexible 
and speeding up technology incorporation; changing the Country’s ethical clearance system and 
the ethical requirements for clinical trials to meet the need of the innovative drug industry, and 
establishing a National Policy for Rare Diseases that allows a prompt incorporation of orphan 
drugs into SUS. Although lobbying affects community health and well-being, this topic is not in 
the public health research agenda. The impacts of pharmaceutical lobbying on health policies 
and health-care costs are of great importance for SUS and deserve to be investigated.
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INTRODUCTION
Lobbying is the act of attempting to persuade legislators and government officials of the 
validity of a particular viewpoint and, by doing so, seeking to influence decisions according 
to certain interests or causes. The word lobby finds its roots in the Latin term ‘laubia’ or 
‘lobia’, employed for a covered walk in the Middle-Ages monasteries, where monks used 
to meet and talk with each other8. At the beginning of the 17th century, the term entered 
into the political vocabulary when it was used to designate the gathering of members of 
parliament, journalists, and influence-seekers in the hallways (lobbies) of legislative chambers 
to make conversation8. A distinction is most often made between advocacy, a broad term 
encompassing a range of activities that a person or organization undertakes to influence 
policies, and lobbying, a type of specific advocacy for influencing legislators and government 
decision makersa.
Lobbying as such is not illegal, nor is it necessarily immoral. As long as it is transparent and 
does not go beyond persuading by argumentation, lobbying is part of the democratic process. 
Nonetheless, it becomes unethical when lobbyists, in one way or another, provide benefits 
to legislators and public officials to misdirect decision-making in Congress and government. 
Under the influence of unethical lobbying, legislators and government officials are prone to 
favor special private interests instead of serving public interests. In fact, in many cases, it is 
hard to distinguish unethical lobbying from a thinly veiled bribery and corruption.
Advocacy towards the promotion of private interests is generally done by organized groups 
of people who are paid directly or indirectly by industries, corporations, or associations of 
companies. In the USA, Canada, Australia, Austria, and some other countries, lobbying is 
regulated and the registration of professional lobbyists is mandatoryb. In the EU parliament, 
where a Transparency Register was set up, and in the UK, Germany, and a few other countries, 
registration of lobbyists is voluntaryb. In Brazil, where lobbying has not been regulated 
so far, a bill (PLS 336/2015) setting up a mandatory lobbying register is currently under 
consideration by the Federal Senatec.
Although the lobbying done by health-care providers, health insurance companies, and 
pharmaceutical and health product industries may influence community health and 
well-being, public health researches have seldom addressed this type of lobbying and its 
consequences. A search in Medline database (as for June 5th, 2015) revealed 4,690 documents 
for the broadest searching term “lobbying”, 129 for “lobbying AND US”, and 10 for “lobbying 
AND Brazil”. For the alternative search strings “big pharma lobbying”, “pharmaceutical 
lobbying”, “pharmaceutical lobbying and US”, and “pharmaceutical lobbying AND Brazil”, 
4, 106, 9, and 1 documents3, respectively, were found.
Pharmaceutical and health product industries spent amounts towards a whopping 
US$3,103,588,993 on lobbying efforts in the US between 1998 and 2015, and the sector 
occupies the top position in the rank of industrial sectors according to total expenditures 
in lobbying (Figure)d. Not surprisingly, pharmaceutical lobby has successfully accomplished 
most goals that favored private interests at the expenses of general public interests.1 
An example along this line is the 2003 Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and 
Modernization Act provision, which prohibits the US government from negotiating prices 
directly with drug companiese. The strength of the pharmaceutical lobby in the country 
is one of the explanations why Americans pay some of the world’s highest prices for their 
prescription drugs. The price escalation of patented medicines has a strong impact on 
health-care costs and restricts population access to more effective therapies. Because of 
ever-rising costs of biotechnology-derived drugs, Obama’s administration has sought to 
negotiate Medicare high-cost drug pricesf. Nonetheless, the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), main lobbying group of the pharmaceutical industry, 
promptly and strongly reacted against this initiative to contain the soaring cost of health-care, 
and it is uncertain whether the US government will eventually succeed in the Congress.
a While lobbying invariably 
involves advocacy, advocacy 
does not necessarily involves 
lobbying. Nonetheless, the line 
between advocacy (not involving 
lobbying) and lobbying is so fine 
that at times it may be hard to 
distinguish them. 
b Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and 
Development – OECD. Lobbyists, 
government and public trust: 
promoting integrity by self-
regulation. In: 405h Session 
of the Public Governance 
Committee; 23-20 Oct 2009; 
Paris. 2009 [cited 2015 Jul 26] 
(GOV/PGC (2009)9). Available 
from: http://www.oecd.org/
officialdocuments/publicdisplayd
ocumentpdf/?doclanguage=en&c
ote=gov/pgc(2009)9
c Pinheiro W. Projeto de Lei 
do Senado Nº 336 de 2015. 
Disciplina a atividade de 
lobby ou de representação 
de interesses no âmbito dos 
órgãos e entidades dos Poderes 
da União, e dos órgãos e 
entidades da Administração 
Pública Federal, e dá outras 
providências. Brasília (DF): 
Senado Federal; 2015 [cited 
2015 Aug 8]. Available from: 
http://www25.senado.leg.
br/web/atividade/materias/-/
materia/121578
d Lobbying Database [Internet]. 
Washington (DC): Center for 
Responsive Politics; 1980 - [cited 
2015 Apr 20]. Available from: 
https://www.opensecrets.org/
lobby/top.php?indexType=s
e Morgan D. Obama 
administration seeks to negotiate 
Medicare drug prices. Reuters 
edition US. Feb 2, 2015 [cited 
year Month day]. Available 
from: http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-budget-medicare-
idUSKBN0L61OW20150202
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In Brazil, where expenditure on lobbying lacks transparency, the Pharmaceutical 
Research Industry Association (Interfarma)f, Brazilian equivalent of PhRMA, plays a 
major role in the advocacy of interests of major drug companies. Propaganda material 
published on its website indicates that Interfarma pursues a variety of private sector 
goals, such asg:
i. Lowering taxes on medicines.
ii. Shortening the time taken by the regulatory agency (ANVISA) to approve marketing 
authorization for a new drug.
iii. Removing ‘administrative hurdles’ that prevent a prompt incorporation of new technologies 
into the Brazilian Unified Healthcare System (SUS).
iv. Combating counterfeit medicines, smuggling, and fiscal fraud.
v. Protecting pharmaceutical products from theft and robbery.
vi. Lessening ‘bureaucratic constraints’ and redundancies in the ethical clearance system 
(CEP/CONEP/ANVISA) to speed up study protocol analysis and make the research 
approval process more flexible.
f Interfarma, founded in 1990, is 
a non-profit organization with 
54 affiliates among the biggest 
pharmaceutical companies 
that sell innovation drugs and 
generics in Brazil (http://www.
interfarma.org.br).
g Interfarma. Cinco sugestões 
para melhorar já a saúde 
do Brasileiro. São Paulo: 
Interfama; [s.d.] [cited 2013 
Sep 13]. Available from: 
http://www.sbmf.org.br/_pdf/
biblioteca/14/5sugestoes_para_
melhorar_ja_a_saude.pdf
Figure. Expenditures of pharmaceutical and health product industry on lobbying activities in the US. 
As shown in panel A (upper part), pharmaceutical and health products industry ranked first among 
the six industry sectors that spent more money in lobbying activities between 1998 and 2015 (as 
to April 20th). Panel B (lower part) shows expenditures of some American drug and biomedicine 
organizations and companies in lobbying in 2014. The total expenditure of the pharmaceutical 
industry on lobbying amounted to US$230,932,063.00, and the number of registered lobbyists 
was 1,419. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association (PhRMA), main lobbyist 
organization in the US, occupies the top position. Data are from the US Senate Office of Public 
Records, retrieved from Center for Responsive Politics website on April 20, 2015 (www.opensecrets.
org.lobby/top.php).
B - Pharmaceutical lobbying in the US (2014)
A - Lobbying in the US from 1998 to 2015
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Interfarma industrious lobby has pressed ANVISA to shorten drug approval time and 
CONITEC (National Committee of Technology Incorporation into SUS) to be more 
flexible about cost-effectiveness criteria and to accelerate the incorporation of new 
drugs and medical technologies into the public health-care system. Interfarma and 
its affiliated drug companies are also close to achieving one of their greatest victories 
in Congress. In February 20, 2015, ANVISA published edits that state that, if it does 
not evaluate applications to conduct phase III trials within 90 days, and the ethical 
clearance system has approved the study protocol, automatically, applicants are to 
be considered as being authorized by the agency to initiate the clinical researchh,i. 
Furthermore, a bill (PLS 200, 2015)j that introduces profound alterations in the Brazilian 
ethical clearance system is now under consideration by the Congress. Although 
meeting most claims of major drug companies and of the Brazilian Association of 
Clinical Investigation, PLS 200/2015 was fiercely criticized by the National Committee 
of Research Ethics (CONEP), the Brazilian Association of Bioethics, and the Brazilian 
Association of Collective Health (ABRASCO)k. The criticisms addressed - but are not 
limited to – bill provisions that
i. open up the possibility for using placebo-controlled groups even when there is an effective 
treatment for the medical condition, if a placebo group is necessary “to comply with a 
justifiable methodological requirement” (Art 27)i;
ii. exempt sponsors from the obligation to ensure post-trial treatment with no charge for 
patients if there is no risk of death or “clinically relevant worsening” of the disease, and if 
there is a “satisfactory therapeutic alternative” in the Country for the medical condition 
(Art 28)i;
iii. allow sponsors to offer money as an incentive for healthy volunteers to take part in phase 
I trials and drug bio-availability and/or bio-equivalence studies (Art 19 §2)i;
iv. create – in addition to institution ethical committees (CEP) – a new type of ethical 
committee (CI, independent ethical committee) that is not linked to a public or 
private institution;
v. state that a single ethical review clearance by either a CEP or a CI is sufficient to begin 
a clinical study.
Another worrisome aspect is that the bill clause that addresses the protection of 
children and other vulnerable subjects (Art 21)i is vague, thereby opening a door to 
interpretations of ethical principles that are less stringent than those that prevail in the 
US and EU. The bill requires an informed consent signed by children’s (or adolescents’) 
parents or legal representatives and states that “...study subjects’ desire to take part in 
the research or to withdraw from it should be respected, whenever he/she is capable 
to evaluate and decide with basis on the received information” (Art 21)i. In EU prevails 
the understanding that parents’ or legal representatives’ consent is insufficient and 
that adolescents above a certain age (13 to 15 years) must themselves be informed 
and formally consent, while younger children must assent to participate in the 
study5,9. For children under eight years of age, a specialized professional should assist 
investigators to interpret the children’s will to participate in the study. Moreover, 
unlike some trials with adults, ethical rules require that children or adolescents who 
are recruited to participate are suffering from the disease5,9. Participation of minors 
who will not potentially benefit from the intervention (i.e., recruitment of individuals 
based on altruism) is at best an ethically delicate topic and, in any case, must not 
involve a foreseeable risk or significant fear, pain, or discomfortl. The bill explicitly 
allows altruistic-based enrollment of children if the “clinical trial is essential for the 
population that the research individual represents” (Art 21)I, and makes no further 
remark regarding risks, discomfort, and participants’ will.
h Ministério da Saúde, Agência 
Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária. 
RDC Nº 9, de 20 de fevereiro de 
2015. Dispõe sobre regulamento 
para realização de ensaios 
clínicos com medicamentos 
no Brasil. Diario Oficial Uniao. 
2015 Mar 3. 
i Ministério da Saúde, Agência 
Nacional de Vigilância 
Sanitária. RDC Nº 10, de 20 de 
fevereiro de 2015. Dispõe sobre 
regulamento para realização de 
ensaio clínico com dispositivos 
médicos no Brasil. Diario Oficial 
Uniao. 2015 Mar 3.
j Amélia A, Moka W, Pinheiro W 
et al. Projeto de lei do Senado 
N0 200, de 2015. Dispõe sobre 
a pesquisa clínica. Brasília 
(DF): Senado Federal; 2015 
[cited 2015 Jul 25]. Available 
from: http://www25.senado.
leg.br/web/atividade/materias/-/
materia/120560
k Associação Brasileira de 
Saúde Coletiva. Projeto de lei 
do Senado nº 200, de 2015, 
retira da sociedade brasileira 
o controle das pesquisas 
envolvendo seres humanos. 
Rio de Janeiro: Abrasco; 2015 
[cited 2015 Jul 24]. Available 
from: https://www.abrasco.org.
br/site/2015/04/projeto-de-lei-
do-senado-no-200-de-2015-
retira-da-sociedade-brasileira-
o-controle-das-pesquisas-
envolvendo-seres-humanos/
l European Commission. Ethical 
considerations for clinical 
trials on medicinal products 
with the paediatric population: 
recommndations of the ad hoc 
group for the developing of 
implementing guidelines for 
Directive 2001/20/EC relating 
to good clinical practice in the 
conduct of clinical trials on 
medicinal products for human 
use: Final 2008 [cited 2015 
Aug 6]. Available from: ftp://
ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/
docs/ethical-considerations-
paediatrics_en.pdf
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In the last years, Interfarma has lobbied for what it calls a “National Policy for Rare Diseases” 
(NPRD) in Brazilm. According to the Brazilian “National Policy of Integral Assistance 
to People with Rare Diseases”, rare diseases are those affecting 65 in 100,000 peoplen. 
Notwithstanding the unequivocal public health relevance of the theme, the pharmaceutical 
industry has its own interests in expanding the market for their “orphan drugs” in the 
country. Orphan drugs are medicines intended to treat rare diseases ( for FDA, illnesses 
affecting < 200,000 people in the US) that sponsors are reluctant to develop under the usual 
marketing conditions. The orphan drugs status designated by US or EU agencies qualifies 
the sponsor of the product for government incentives that make their development more 
attractive. Pharmaceutical companies, however, have realized that, despite the small 
patient pool, the revenue potential of orphan drugs may offer great profitability if they 
are marketed at “the right price” across their lifetimeo. In other words, these drugs can be 
highly profitable for pharmaceutical companies that adopt them. Interfarma proposals 
for a NPRD include “ensuring patient access to care and treatments”, “a differentiated 
registration mechanisms to accelerate the entry and sale of orphan drugs in the Brazilian 
market”, and “facilitating incorporation of orphan drugs into SUS”k. Interfarma identifies 
cost-effectiveness criteria currently employed as “barriers” to be overcome and suggests 
that the incorporation of orphan drugs into clinical protocols must be based on “clinical 
need” (i.e., “drugs must be considered clinically effective and necessary for treatment, 
but without meeting the criteria of cost-effectiveness”)k. Although maintaining that its 
proposal is viable, Interfarma anticipated that costs with orphan drugs would raise and 
affect public accountsk. The ongoing lobbying for NPRD illustrates that the pharmaceutical 
industry seeks to influence the establishment of health policy priorities and to align them 
with its own interests.
Like the wolf in sheep’s clothing of Aesop’s fable, pharmaceutical lobbying often hides its 
real intent under the guise of patients’ or doctors’ claims. It has become a common fact that 
patients’ organizations are in the forefront of lobbying campaigns for new drug approval and 
incorporation into SUS. Nonetheless, patients’ organizations generally rely on financial support 
from pharmaceutical companies, and such relationships are not fully transparent6,7. The extent 
to which the supporting industry influences the agenda and priorities of patient organizations 
is unclear6. At any rate, conflicts of interest and the various forms of collaboration between 
these unequal partners (one affluent and the other generally poor) raise justifiable concerns. 
Needless to say, medical associations’ positions about new medicines efficacy, safety, and 
cost-effectiveness can also be misdirected by drug industry lobbying2,4,10.
Furthermore, lobbying strategies often disguise drug companies’ real purposes by hiding 
them under the cover of a general claim of Brazilian society. Examples along this line are the 
Interfarma-sponsored “parliamentary study missions on innovation policies” to the US and 
the UK in 2011 (18 Congress members), 2012 (11 members), 2013 (7 members), and 2015p. 
The missions the alleged purpose of which was promotion of innovation in Brazil certainly 
paved the way for introducing PLS 200-2015 provisions that weaken the Country’s ethical 
requirements for clinical trials.
In conclusion, lobbying as such is not necessarily bad and at times it may be justifiable 
and needed (e.g., to defend minorities’ interests and rights against majority ruling). For 
democracy’s sake, however, it must be transparent, and a mandatory lobby register must 
be setup in the Country. Moreover, impacts of pharmaceutical lobbying on health policies, 
health-care costs, and clinical research regulation are topics of great importance for the 
Brazilian Unified Health System and should be included in the public health research agenda.
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